verify

crabbox verify checks a signed run receipt produced by crabbox run --attest. It recomputes the receipt's canonical bytes, verifies the embedded Ed25519 signature, and prints the signer's public key fingerprint, so a reviewer can confirm a pasted receipt has not been edited after the run once they have matched the fingerprint through a trusted channel.

crabbox run --attest receipt.json -- go test ./...
crabbox verify receipt.json

On success it prints one line and exits 0:

PASS receipt.json signer=sha256:6a5f... trust=self-signed

If any signed field was modified after signing, it prints a failure line and exits 1:

FAIL receipt.json signer=sha256:6a5f... trust=self-signed: signature mismatch

A receipt that cannot be checked at all (unreadable file, invalid JSON, duplicate JSON keys, a missing or malformed public_key or signature) exits 2 with an error on stderr. Duplicate keys are rejected outright because JSON parsers disagree on which duplicate wins, which would let an edited receipt show one value to a reader while the signature still verifies against another.

#Receipt format

The receipt is a flat JSON object. schema_version, generated_at, provider, command, exit_code, command_ms, and public_key are always present; lease_id, slug, run_id, actions_url, and log_sha256 appear when the run produced them. log_sha256 is the SHA-256 of the combined stdout and stderr stream as observed by the client during SSH-backed runs.

The signature covers the canonical encoding of every field except signature itself: the object is re-marshaled as compact JSON with lexicographically sorted keys, and the Ed25519 signature is computed over those bytes. Because public_key is inside the signed payload, swapping in a different key also fails verification.

#Keys

Signing uses a per-user Ed25519 key that crabbox run --attest mints on first use at <user config dir>/crabbox/attest/id_ed25519.pem (PKCS8 PEM, file mode 0600). Pass --attest-key <path> to crabbox run to sign with an existing PKCS8 PEM Ed25519 key instead; the override path is never auto-created.

Verification trusts the key embedded in the receipt and reports its fingerprint. Binding that fingerprint to an identity is out of scope: compare it out of band with the signer. The trust=self-signed marker is printed on every verification result so PASS cannot be mistaken for an identity or execution-provenance check.

#Non-goals

crabbox verify proves integrity and possession of the signing key, not identity or execution provenance. There are no trust roots, no transparency log, and no coordinator-held keys in this version.